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Constitutional Law-Taxation-Validity of State Stock Transfer Tax on Seller in
Interstate Sale-[New York].-The state of New York levied a stock transfer tax to
be paid by the seller totalling three cents per share sold for twenty dollars or less and
four cents per share sold for twenty dollars or more on "all sales, agreements to sell or
memoranda of sale and all deliveries or transfers of shares.", The plaintiffs, New York
brokers, negotiated by telephone, telegraph, and mail to sell stock to dealers in Philadelphia and Washington, D.C., sent confirmations by mail, and finally completed the
sales by mailing for collection to banks in these cities sight drafts with the stock
certificates attached. Title to the certificates did not pass until payment was received.
Upon appeal from dismissal of the plaintiff's claim for refund of taxes paid upon these
transactions, held, the imposition of the New York tax upon these stock transfers did
not violate the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. Judgment affirmed with
three judges dissenting. O'Kane v. State.3
The instant case raises the problem of how states can tax interstate sales without
giving a competitive advantage to either out-of-state or local sellers. As long as the
commerce clause was thought to exempt interstate sales from state taxation,3 a state
sales tax handicapped local sellers, for large purchasers could usually buy outside the
state. Conversely, if the commerce clause is interpreted to give no protection against
state taxation, both the state of the seller and the state of the buyer may tax the sale
and thereby put the out-of-state seller at a disadvantage. Recent decisions of the
Supreme Court seem to indicate that it is taking a middle course: interstate commerce must pay its own way but may not be subject to multiple taxation.4 From the
point of view of competitive advantage, freedom of interstate commerce is achieved if
the taxes give buyers no reason to choose between out-of-state and local sellers. Any
tax which gives a preference to either class of sellers regulates interstate commerce and
is invalid under the commerce clause.
The constitutionality of a sales tax by the buyer state upon an interstate sale was
upheld by the Supreme Court in McGoldrick v. Berwi nd-White Co.5 It has been pointed
out that to allow only seller states to tax interstate sales gives a competitive advantage
to sellers from states without or with very low sales taxes, but that to allow only,
buyer states to tax interstate sales affects all sellers equally.6 The principal case presents the question of the constitutionality of a tax on interstate sales imposed by the
seller state.
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RECENT CASES
The foregoing analysis of the effect of sales taxes by buyer and seller states seems to
ignore certain practical differences between taxes on sellers and taxes on buyers. Sales
taxes imposed by seller states put the sellers of the taxing state at a competitive disadvantage and, therefore, are not likely to be either large or numerous. The absence
of effective out-of-state competition with the New York Stock Exchange is probably
the factor that makes the present tax expedient. In any case, a tax by the seller state
would only seem to burden interstate commerce if it were passed on to the buyer, for
only then would interstate commerce be subject to multiple taxation. If absorbed by
the sellers, such taxes would affect interstate commerce no more than admittedly constitutional taxes on the net income,7 property,8 and franchises9 of sellers. The small
amount of the present tax, less than one-sixth of one per cent, and the requirement in the
statute that it be paid by the seller,1° may indicate that this tax will be absorbed by the
sellers. Yet the Supreme Court has held invalid the nearest equivalent of a sales tax
on sellers, a gross receipts tax, where income from without the taxing state was ineluded, without considering whether the tax was passed on to the out-of-state buyers. X
And the uncertainties and difficulties involved in determining whether a tax is passed
on to buyers make this factor a poor one upon which to rest the validity of the tax.
The possibility that the tax may be absorbed by the sellers and therefore become in
effect a tax on the business of selling securities seems, however, the only justification
for the court's argument that the tax in the principal case is a tax upon a "local
activity" solely within the jurisdiction of the taxing state.'2 This theory is inconsistent with the statute's description of the tax as upon "sales or agreements to sell,"
which in the principal case do not seem to be local activities. But the court argued that
the tax was a "sales tax .... on the seller" and that, since no other state could levy
a "sales tax .... on the seller," although another state might levy a "sales tax ....
on the buyer," multiple taxation was impossible.*s Under an extreme application of
such a theory any aspect of interstate commerce (for example, carrying freight one
mile) could be split off from the rest of the commerce, called a local activity, and taxed
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by the state. If the choice of what aspects of transactions to tax were made by one
taxing authority, that fact would be some guarantee of consistency and harmony; but
where the choices are made by two or more taxing authorities, as is the situation in an
interstate sale, not only is there no such guarantee but experience seems to indicate
that the states would tax as many subjects as possible without considering previous
taxation in other states. Perhaps the solution of the already too complicated taxable
4
aspect problem lies in federal legislation.r

Corporations-Amendment of Charter-Power of Illinois Corporation to Issue Prior
Preferred Stock-[Iiinois].-An Illinois corporation, organized under the General
Corporation Act of i919, z amended its articles of incorporation in 1928. Clause (e) of
this amendment provided, "the corporation shall not at any time create any stock having rights or preferences superior to the .... preferred stock .... without the affirma-

tive vote of at least two thirds of the preferred stock then outstanding." Thereafter
the corporation issued shares of eight per cent cumulative preferred stock with a par
value of $5o.oo a share, of which the plaintiff acquired 622 in i93o. In 1933, the General Corporation Act was repealed by enactment of the Business Corporation Act,2
permitting authorization of prior issues of preferred stock by two-thirds vote of the
outstanding preferred shares.3 In 1936, when approximately $20.00 in unpaid dividends had accrued on each share of the preferred stock, the articles of incorporation
were amended by a vote exceeding two-thirds of the preferred shares outstanding to
authorize the issuance of a new class of stock, having preference over the outstanding
preferred shares in respect to dividends and distribution of the assets upon dissolution
or liquidation. By this amendment the par value of the outstanding preferred shares
was reduced from $5o.oo to $io.oo but the dividend return, redemption price, rights
upon dissolution or liquidation, and priority over the common remained unchanged.
The holders of shares of preferred stock were given the option to exchange each of
these together with accumulated arrearages for one and four-tenths prior preferred
shares.4 The plaintiff's stock was not voted on the proposed amendments, and an
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The owner of each share of preferred stock was entitled to an annual dividend of $4.00.
If he exchanged for prior preferred stock under the plan, he would receive one and four-tenths
shares, entitled to a maximum dividend, if earned, of $3.00 a share; a minimum dividend,
whether earned or not, of $i.oo a share. Thus, the maximum annual income on the one and
four-tenths shares would be $4.20; the minimum, $1.40. The shareholder would have given up
accrued dividends of approximately $2o.oo a share for the possible annual dividend increase
of $.2o, a net increase in income of one per cent of the book value of the accrual surrendered. If
he wished to retain his preferred shares, he would not receive annual dividends or payment on
arrearages until dividends on prior preferred stock were paid or provided for, a possible
maximum of $6oooo.oo.
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